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J URISDICTION 
This appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure as an appeal from, a final order from the Second Judicial District Court 
nuci'i,' in o(inI'IIIIii iinim mi jaiHiian /m .'mu unci CIIICI 1:111 tn 111c court on Matin P<> . uu 
(Add. K). The appeal was filed within the time pet: iod prescribed by Rule * ^ the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on March 26, 2010 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
*> hethc* UK- irial v on- erred in (is interpretation or application of Utah R. Ci\ P. 
oinderoi Person^ lw.«Ai '^Adjudication. 
>dndu;^ .n Review * -•* •' iilmji, regarding Joiiul'i ' 
reviewed ior abuse of discretion. However, the court's interpretation oi Rule 19 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. USA Power, LLC et al v. 
1 *acifi( 11/ /» 2010 1 1 1 31; 200801 ; 6 (I J I SC •). 
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-iOiu^ ^Mcniu m Support of 
Intervention), Add J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in 
Kepi j din riainlilT f >pposilion to Inter \ ention R I ' 2C) p 104 I ,v I (I I-1 \ 
2. Whether die trial court erred in its interpretation or application of T Ttaf • 
24 - Intervention 
Standard of Review: Motions to intervene involve both questions of law and 
fact Moreno \ Rii ofEihu Of Ionian School I hst, cr'"fi P?il KKfi MP {I Huh 
1996). Legal rulings and conclusions are reviewed for correctness w ith no 
1 
deference. Mandatory Intervention under rule 24(a) turns on a legal 
determination, which is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 
1074, 1077 (Utah 2000); Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement Dist v. Olds, 
224 P.3d 709 (Utah 2009). The decision to allow Intervention as of right is 
reviewed for correctness. M&S Cox Investments, LLC v. Provo City Corp., 169 
P.3d 789 (Utah App. 2007). 
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of 
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in 
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443 
3. Whether the trial court's determinations regarding Joinder under Rule 19 and 
Intervention under Rule 24 are supported by any evidence and adequate findings 
of fact. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings must be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough facts to show the evidence upon which they are grounded. 
Findings of fact must show that the court's ruling follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence. 
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R, F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of 
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in 
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443 
4. WhettiiT Hie liiitl v oil ill iTinii n\ ,i niiilhT oil \i\\\ h\ iu|iiiriny appdlaiil I > 
. demonstrate that it will be bound b} tht* judgment in the existing case before 
Intervention will be allowed under Rule 24, as recently amended. 
Standard of Review : \ ti ial c: on i t's conclusions of la \ \ in the intei pi u -i > 
Rules of Civil Procedure are review ed for correctness. "Correctness" means that 
no particular deference is given to trial coi irt rulings of questions of lam See 
Arbogast J i; amil) i,! 1 > ust i» Rivei Q ossings, L LC 2:38 I ,l 3d 1035 (I Jtah2010) 
ti loinder of parties and to set aside judgment V \ M*
 l-, 10415-10443 
5. Whether iii^ n ial conr* erred as n rnntter oi
 Wi v* v (ailing to apply 7KII IV40 \ 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law in a civil case regarding 
the interpretation of statutes are reviewed for correctness. "Correctness" means 
that no |Miliuilii: -i •;..-. > - • .i. « ^ .. . • ^
 s 
See Estate of High- - ^7 -
 w-» 238 i\2d 1089 (Utah Ann '"» 
Preserved on Appeal. \«M I ? Supplemental Memorandum of I aw in smppon of 
Motion In liikiu'iic 1'" I ,'K \\ Mil 'in 101 < I 
6. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to grant appellants 
motion to intervene. 
Standard, of Review': A Motion to intervene involves questions of law and fact. 
• Moreno <i V> PM KKl'i. KKX (I If.iii l<>%> I llur distil* ( uiHitll s iojji ' • 
determinations are reviewed for correctness affording no deference to its 
3 
conclusions. Id. The district court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Id. "Mandatory Intervention under Rule 24(a) turns 
on a legal determination which is reviewed de nova." Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074, 
1077; Taylor-West, 224 P.3d 709. The decision to allow Intervention as of right 
is reviewed for correctness. M & S Cox Investments, 169P.3d789. 
Preserved on Appeal: Add. C- R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102 (Memo in Support of 
Intervention), Add. J Transcript Motion Hearing p. 1109-1143, Add. H Memo in 
Reply to Plaintiff Opposition to Intervention R.F.29 p. 10415-10443 
ISSUES PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT 
Appellant filed a "Motion for Intervention to Join Parties and Set Aside 
Judgment/'1 together with a Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and 
Counter-claim,2 and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene.3 A 
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene based on 
78B-6-403 UCA 1953 was also filed,4 which includes a ruling by Judge Allphin in 
See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Motion for Intervention to Join Parties and Set Aside 
Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum A ("Add. A") at R. F. 28 p. 10013-10052; 
together with Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Rulings, attached hereto as 
Addendum T ("Add. T") R. F. 28 p. 9944-9946. 
2
 See Appellant/Dynasty Corp Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and 
Counter-Claim, attached hereto as Addendum B ("Add. B") at R. File 28 p. 10053-
10062 
3
 See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to 
Intervene, attached hereto as Addendum C ("Add. C") at R. File 28 p. 10064-10102. 
4
 See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion to Intervene, attached hereto as Addendum D ("Add. D.") at R. F. 28 p. 
10176-10178 
A 
CIMINO " l" Hil lii1"! HI 1 ;> J! Ilhhni>\ Skv/nu b i tukh wm i \ 4\sih anion 1 Plaintiff 
responded to Appellee's Motion and Memorandum in two responses: (1) "Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Dynasty Corporations Motion to Join Parties and Set aside 
judgmeiif ' iiiiiii I.1") '"PlninhlTs < >ppi>sili<Mi In I Hii;is.h f 'orporalmns IViolioiii lu 
Intervene/'' ' Appellant filed a "Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Menu :«i indi 1m 
in Opposition to Joinder of Parties and u* Set \ i^de Judgment,"** together with 
Appella 1:11' 5 "Memorandum in Kepi * ,«wi;.;. :, . ^-.noranduiu in Opposition to 
Intervention/'9 which was argi led <m Initial > 2U, ?(III (I f l" I "liiTcaftn n w irii I I 111 
ruling denying Intervc«111 *»11 was entered,11 
5
 See Ruling, Judge Allphin U \ il L asc No. 9907001225 libeling v. Sk>park 
Landowners Association, attached hereto as Addendum E C Add. f -") at R. !• 28 
p.10180-10183 
See Appellee/Plaintiffs Opposition to Dynasty Corp'. Motion to Join Parties and 
Set Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum F ("Add. F") at R. F. 29 p. 
10306-10311 
n
 n 
See Appellee/Plaintiffs Opposition to Dynasty Corp. Motion to Intervene, 
attached hereto as Addendum G ("Add. G") at R. F. 29 p. 10314-10368 
8
 See Appellant/Dynasty Corp. Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition to Joinder and to Set Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum 
H ("Add. H") at R. F. 29 p. 10415-10443 
9
 See Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition n 
Intervention, attached hereto as Addendum I ("Add. I") at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514 
10
 See Transcript of Motion Hearing, January 26,1999, attached hereto as 
Addendum J ("Add. J") p. 1109-1143 (Hearing resulting in denial of Intervention) 
'See Ruling Denying Motion to Intervene and Join Additional Parties and Set 
Aside Judgment, attached hereto as Addendum K ("Add. K") at R. V. 31 p.10935-
10937 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
UtahR. Civ. P. 19: Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
a. Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose Joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the 
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among 
those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the 
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the 
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his 
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order 
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to 
do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an 
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his 
Joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
b. Determination by court whenever Joinder not feasible. If a person as 
described in Subdivision (a) (l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, 
the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the 
action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. 
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent 
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to 
him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
A 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be 
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy 
if the action is dismissed for non-joinder. 
c. Pleading reasons for nonjoinder, A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as 
described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the 
reasons why they are not joined. 
d. Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24: Intervention 
a. Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to Intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
b. Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to Intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to Intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or 
defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a 
governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, 
requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or 
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may 
7 
be permitted to Intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion 
the court shall consider whether the Intervention will unduly delay 
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
c. Procedure. A person desiring to Intervene shall serve a Motion to 
Intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The Motions shall 
state the grounds therefore and shall be accompanied by a pleading 
setting forth the claim or defense for which Intervention is sought. 
d. Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances. 
L If a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute in an action in 
which the Attorney General has not appeared, the party raising the 
question of constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of 
such fact. The court shall permit the state to be heard upon timely 
application. 
2. If a party challenges the constitutionality of a county or municipal 
ordinance in an action in which the county or municipal attorney 
has not appeared, the party raising the question of constitutionality 
shall notify the county or municipal attorney of such fact. The court 
shall permit the county or municipality to be heard upon timely 
application. 
3. Failure of a party to provide notice as required by this rule is not a 
waiver of any constitutional challenge otherwise timely asserted. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Section 78B-6-403 
1. When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties 
who have or claim any interest, which would be affected by the 
declaration, and a declaration may not prejudice the rights of 
persons not parties to the proceeding. 
Q 
2. In any proceeding, which involves the validity of a municipal or 
county ordinance or franchise, the municipality or county shall be 
made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard. 
3. If a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid, the 
attorney general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and 
be entitled to be heard, 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a "Motion to Intervene; Join Additional 
Parties and Set Aside Judgment,"12 
Appellant, Dynasty Corporation ("Dynasty") owns property within Skypark 
Industrial Park that is subject to assessment and burdened by certain restrictive 
covenants applicable to all property owners in the Industrial Park. 
In 1999, Dynasty commenced an action against the Skypark Landowners 
Association seeking an order declaring that the 1979 CC&R's of the Skypark 
Industrial Park had been amended by the action of property owners deleting 
restrictive land use covenants and prohibiting the Property Owners Association from 
changing any land use provisions. Dynasty's action was dismissed because all 
persons affected by it had not been notified or joined pursuant to Section 78B-6-4-4 
UCA.13 
Shortly after learning that this action had been filed and tried, but before a 
final judgment had been entered, Dynasty filed an action against Skypark Airport 
12
 Add. A at R. F. 28 p.10013-10023 
13
 Add D at R. F. 28 p. 10176-10179 
9 
Association ("SAA") seeking the opposite declaratory relief that SAA sought 
against the "Gas Buster"14 defendants with the exception of enforcement if the 
covenants were found not to be abandoned but on a uniform basis against all 
landowners.15 The action filed by SAA against the "Gas Buster" defendants (this 
action on appeal in which Dynasty's Intervention was denied) sought to enforce 
restrictive land use covenants against the "Gas Busters" to prevent the sale of 
aviation fuel and to prevent Charles Ward from conducting a helicopter business.16 
Because of Dynasty's prior experience in having an action involving the 
Skypark Industrial Park covenants dismissed for failure to join all parties,17 Dynasty 
sought the Joinder of all landowners of Skypark Airport Industrial Park property 
who were burdened by the CC&R's that SAA sought to enforce against the "Gas 
Buster" defendants. Dynasty's motion to join, unlike either SAA's complaint 
against the "Gas Buster" defendants, or the counter claim initiated by the "Gas 
Buster" defendants, sought the Joinder of all other landowners who were in 
violation of the CC&R's. In addition to landowners within the boundary of Skypark 
Industrial Park, Dynasty also sought to join all landowners that SAA had allegedly 
fraudulently assessed, pursuant to a 1985 CC&R document. 
14
 "Gas Buster" defendants include: Jay Jensen, Layne Barnes, Larry Clark, Peter 
Lawson, Jim Roach, Peter Stevens, Andy Wallace, Charles Ward, Skypark L.C. the 
property owners who were members of the Co-op known as gas busters who were 
buying and selling aviation fuel to members of the Co-op. 
15
 See Complaint, Dynasty v. SAA, Civil No. 090700634, attached hereto as 
Addendum L ("Add. L") at R. F. 32 p.10168-11094 
16
 See Complaint, SAA v. Jensen et. al., attached hereto as Addendum M ("Add. 
M") at R. F. 32 p. 10961-11049 (demand for relief paragraph 4 seeks general 
enforcement of restrictive covenants, not just fuel sales). 
17
 Add. E at R. F 28 p.10180-10183 
m 
Prior to filing the Motion to Intervene and Join Additional Parties in the "Gas 
Buster" action, the court ordered the Joinder of all of the property owners in 
Skypark Industrial Park, together with all property owners who had been wrongfully 
•jo 
assessed, as parties in the separate action commenced by Dynasty against SAA. 
The motion was briefed and argued before Judge Page, the same judge who 
previously joined all parties in the Dynasty v. SAA case, who denied the motion 
because (1) it was not "timely filed," (2) "the interests of the parties seeking 
Intervention was adequately protected by defendants," and (3) "the parties seeking 
Intervention failed to demonstrate that they may be bound by the judgment in this 
aetion."(Add. K) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 30,2009, Dynasty commenced an action in the Second District 
Court against SAA (Civil No. 090700634).19 The action alleged that SAA had 
made and collected fraudulent assessments against all property owners in the 
Skypark Industrial Park, as well as other owners who had been fraudulently 
assessed but were not owners within the Skypark Industrial Park, Additionally, 
the action sought an Order declaring the restrictive land use covenants of the 
1979 CC&R's burdening property within the Skypark Industrial Park to be 
declared abandoned and void or in the alternative uniformly enforced. 
See Order Joining Parties, attached hereto as Addendum N ("Add. N") at R. F. 32 
). 11093-11101 
9
 Add. L at R. F. p. 10168-11083 
11 
2. In addition to commencing Civil No. 090700634, Dynasty sought an Order 
joining all property owners subject to the CC&R's burdening the landowners of 
the Skypark Industrial Park together with all landowners who had been 
fraudulent assessed by SAA.20 
3. Although Civil No. 090700634 was assigned to Judge Connors, the Order 
Joining Parties was executed by Judge Rodney Page, who is the judge in the 
action below. 
4. The undisputed declaration of M.K. Ebeling, submitted in support of Dynasty's 
Motion for Intervention, provides that Dynasty was not notified nor was it aware 
that any action had been commenced by SAA against "Gas Buster" defendants 
or any other person seeking to enforce the 1979 CC&R's of the Skypark 
Industrial Park, or that a counter-claim had been filed seeking the return of 
wrongful assessments until sometime after the jury trial had been conducted. 
Had Dynasty been notified or otherwise made aware of the action, it would have 
sought to Intervene at that time.22 
5. Neither Dynasty, nor any of its representatives, was present at any meeting 
where the litigation was discussed. 
6. The undisputed declaration of Jerry R. Webber, a certified general appraiser with 
an MAI designation from the Appraisal Institute, submitted in support of 
20
 Add. O at R. F. 32 p. 11090-11091 
21
 Add. P at R. F. 32 p. 11093-11102 
22
 See Declaration of M. K. Ebeling ("Ebeling Deck"), attached hereto as 
Addendum Q ("Add. Q") at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130 
23
 Add. Q at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130 
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Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, indicates that "the strict and literal interpretation 
of the Commercial Aviation covenants and restrictions have not been enforced/' 
The ruling in this action "negatively affects every property subject to the 
restrictions because the market is limited to non-commercial uses/' Had this 
ruling been made "at the time I completed other appraisals, the valuation would 
have most likely been adversely affected."24 
7. The undisputed declaration of real estate broker Gabe Chadsey, submitted in 
support of Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, provides that he was and has been 
familiar with the restrictive covenants that impact properties within the Skypark 
Airport project. Prior to the trial, an inspection of the Skypark property would 
"cause any reasonable person to believe that the restrictive covenants precluding 
aviation business at Skypark to have been ignored, abandoned, or waved." The 
market for purchasers of Skypark property, in the event the covenants are 
determined to be enforceable, "would be reduced by 75%." ... "That is to say 
that people who are interested in purchasing property at Skypark Airport are 
primarily interested in conducting aviation-related business." The practical 
effect of the ruling determining the applicability and enforceability of the 
restrictive land use covenants affecting the Skypark property impacts every 
See Declaration of Jerry R. Webber ("Webber DecL"), attached hereto as 
Addendum R ("Add. R") at R. F. 32 p. 11132-11133 
13 
property subject to the restrictions because the market is limited to non-
commercial uses/' 
8. The issues core issues raised in the Dynasty v. SAA action26 (Civil No. 
090700634) are identical to the issues of this action.27 
9. Dynasty filed a motion with a "Proposed Answer to Appellee's Complaint and 
Counter-claim/' seeking to Intervene as a defendant and to join all of the parties 
who Judge Page had previously joined in the Dynasty action to this action.28 
The counter-claim raised the issue of the return of the fraudulent assessments 
that SAA had agreed to credit defendant in the settlement agreement29 but 
because no other person was before the court, Judge Page had no jurisdiction to 
order the return of any assessments to fraudulently assessed persons. 
MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE 
Facts supporting the courts legal conclusion set forth in its ruling denying 
Intervention in Addendum K: 
A. Dynasty Motion to Intervene was not timely filed: 
i. Skypark Airport Association complaint v. Jensen et. al. filed Nov 13, 
2002 (Add. M) R. F. 1 p. 1-93 
See Declaration of real estate broker Gabe Chadsey ("Chadsey DecL"), attached 
hereto as Addendum S ("Add. S") at R. F. 32 p. 11135-11136 
26
 Add. L at R. F. 31 p. 1016841094 
27
 Add. M at R. F. 32 p. 10961-11049 (Complaint of Appellee seeking the 
enforcement of the 1979 CC&R's of Skypark Industrial Park); Add. B at 10053-
10062 
28
 Add. B at R. F. 28 p. 10053-10062 
29
 See Settlement Agreement (between Appellee and defendants), attached hereto as 
Addendum T ("Add. T") at R. F. 28 p. 9946-9955 
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ii. Answer and Counter Claim filed by Jensen et. al. January 17, 
2003(Add. N) R. F. 1 p.95-110 
iii. Jury Verdict made August 21,2009 (Add. U) R. F. 28 p. 9944-9946 
iv. Motion to Intervene filed September 29,2009 filed 1 month following 
jury verdict (Add. A) R. F. 28 p. 10013-10052 
B. That "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented Dynasty's interest: 
i. Counter-claim filed by "Gas Buster" defendants alleging that the 
restrictive covenants of the CC& R's were abandoned and waived (Add. 
N)R.F. 1 p. 95-110 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Gas Buster defendants failed to adequately represent the interest of Dynasty 
Corporation and the individuals and entities Dynasty sought to join as 
intervening defendants in the Gas Buster action because the interests of the Gas 
Buster defendants were not aligned with Dynasty's. Dynasty's interest in 
seeking to Intervene was to preserve its property value and marketability, and to 
ensure an equal playing field in the enforcement or waiver of the 1979 restrictive 
land use covenants, while the interest of the Gas Buster defendants was only to 
have the 1979 covenants declared waived and abandoned. 
2. Dynasty Corporation's Motion to Intervene, Join Parties, and Set Aside 
Judgment, although filed after a jury verdict, was filed in a timely manner. 
Dynasty's declaration as to when it first learned of the action was undisputed. 
Utah case law recognizes circumstances of entitlement and justification for filing 
15 
Intervention later than my be considered timely on a strong showing of 
entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as 
will justify the failure to seek Intervention earlier." Parduhn v. Bennett, 112 P.3d 
495, 501 (Utah 2005). 
3. The lower court failed to rule on the application of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 when it 
failed to engage in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the party sought to be joined 
"has a sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary party," and if it does 
(2) is Joinder feasible? Turville v. J & J Properties, L.C., 145 P.3d 1146 (Utah 
App. 2006), citing Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App. 
1989). The failure to find that Dynasty and the parties it sought to join in the 
Gas Buster action were necessary parties creates the likelihood of inconsistent 
judgments, defeating the purpose of Utah R. Civ. P. 19 as discussed in 
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). 
4. The court's interpretation and subsequent application of Utah R. Civ. P. 24 
requiring a showing that the Intervenor will be bound by the judgment before 
Intervention will be allowed, was based on a text of Rule 2f4 that had been 
amended, and pursuant to Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 312 (Utah 1997), 
now mandates Intervention on even more liberal terms than it did in Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The court's finding that Dynasty Corporation's interests were 
adequately protected by the Gas Buster defendants was legal error. 
Dynasty Corporation, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 24, filed a Motion to 
Intervene as of right, in an action commenced by SAA against Jay Jensen and others 
(the "Gas Buster Defendants"). SAA v. Gas Buster defendants, the case at bar was 
initiated by SAA to prevent the "Gas Busters" from selling aviation fuel. SAA was 
seeking to enforce certain restrictive land use covenants against the "Gas Buster" 
defendants that burden all Skypark Industrial Park land owners. Because Dynasty 
believed that the restrictive land use covenants had been long since abandoned, it 
was concerned that in the event the "Gas Buster" action determined the restrictive 
covenants to be enforceable, its property value and the marketability of its property 
would be negatively impacted and additionally in the event they were not uniformly 
enforced if found not to be abandoned the same result would occur. 
Dynasty Corporation does not sell fuel. Dynasty Corporation's interest is to 
preserve its property value and marketability of its property and to secure and 
maintain an even playing field regarding those issues with all other property owners 
in Skypark Industrial Park who are burdened by the restrictive land use covenants of 
the 1979 CC&R's of Skypark Industrial Park. 
Dynasty Corporation's Complaint seeks a declaration finding the covenants 
to have been abandoned or waived or requiring uniformity in the application of the 
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1979 land use covenants between all property owners who are burdened by them. 
(Add. L) This is the reason Dynasty moved to join the parties it did and who are 
joined in the pending action versus SAA by Dynasty Corporation. 
The Complaint filed by Dynasty that joined all other property owners in this 
action contains two causes of action:30 
(1) seeking a judgment in an amount representing all unauthorized or 
wrongfully calculated assessments made and collected 
(2) seeking "an Order declaring said land use restrictions set forth in 
Section IV of the 1979 Restrictive Covenants applicable to the 
Skypark Industrial Park land owners, to be abandoned and waived and 
to be of no force and affect or in the alternative entering an Order 
declaring the entirety of said land use restrictions to be enforceable 
and enjoining all parties from continuing any business or leasing or 
allowing any business to operate on their property in violation of said 
land use restriction of Section IV of Exhibit 1. 
SAA's action against the "Gas Buster" defendants was a fight about aviation 
fuel sales. SAA argued that it has a right to sell fixel in Skypark Industrial Park and 
sought to enjoin the "Gas Buster" defendants from selling aviation fuel. The 
instrument used by SAA to enjoin the "Gas Buster" defendants from selling fixel 
was the restrictive covenants of the 1979 Skypark Industrial Park.31 SAA's entire 
purpose was to stop competition between Gas Busters and itself. 
30Add.LatR.F.31 
31
 Add. L at R. F. 31 exhibit A to complaint restrictive covenants p. 10178-10185 
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The "Gas Buster" defendants9 Answer and Counter-Claim challenged the 
enforceability of the 1979 covenants claiming they had been long since waived and 
abandoned. The counter-claim also challenged liens and certain assessments as 
fraudulent and wrongful.32 Dynasty Corporation's interest and reason to challenge 
and/or seek uniform enforcement of the 1979 restrictive land use covenants was and 
is much broader and had nothing to do with fuel sales. 
By ruling that the "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented Dynasty 
Corporation's interest, the court initially committed error when it failed to recognize 
that the "Gas Buster" defendants totally ignored Dynasty's claim of wrongful 
assessment against SAA. This was particularly apparent when the parties executed 
the Stipulation for Resolution of Remaining Accounting Issues. The trial record is 
void of any evidence regarding the wrongfulness or amount of assessment made by 
SAA and paid by Dynasty and the other property owners in the Skypark Industrial 
Park. 
It appears the lower court recognized this inequity when it realized it had no 
jurisdiction to order SAA to return assessments to persons who were not before the 
court, and thus executed Dynasty's motion to join parties in the ongoing action 
against SAA.34 Clearly, had the "Gas Buster" defendants adequately represented 
Dynasty's interest, it would not have been necessary for Dynasty to commence an 
independent action and to join others in order for complete relief to be granted in the 
H Add. B at R. F. 28 p. 10053-10063 
33
 Add. T. at R. F. 28 p. 9946-9955 
34
 Add. P at R.F. 32 p. 11093-11102 
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form of an order enforcing the restrictive land use covenants equally as to all 
property owners and seeking the return of fraudulent assessments. The lower court's 
ruling (Add U) applied only that portion of the restrictive covenants preventing fuel 
sales and did not enforce the entirety of the restrictive covenant which provides: 
No commercial aviation business, no fuel sales, maintenance or 
mechanical business, air craft sale or leasing, charter services, or for hire 
aircraft maintenance or mechanical services performed on airplanes or 
aviation equipment kept or stored on the property. (Add. A (exhibit 
1)1979 declarations) 
Additionally, and as argued at the motion hearing,35 the court erred in ruling 
that defendants had adequately represented Dynasty's interest, because the Dynasty 
action was not only seeking an Order declaring the restrictive covenants to be 
abandoned or waived it sought an order, in the alternative that in the event the 
covenants are found to be enforceable, that the covenants prohibiting all aviation 
business be enforced against all property owners, including the "Gas Buster" 
defendants, who are in violation (Add. L) The issue that all property owners who are 
burdened by the restrictive land use covenants be treated uniformly is at the heart of 
Dynasty Corporation's interest in preserving its property value and marketability 
(Add. R & S Declarations of Weber and Chadsy) The court's finding that the "Gas 
Buster" defendants "adequately protected Dynasty's interest" is far too broad and 
cannot be considered legally sufficient to establish adequate representation 
pertaining to Dynasty's interest in preserving its property value and marketability 
35
 Add. J at 12-16 (Transcript of Hearing) 
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particularly as it relates to uniformity in application as to all property owners 
burdened by the restrictive land use covenants. 
The record contains no evidence or discussion that property values or 
marketability were considered or discussed by the "Gas Buster" defendants. 
However, the record clearly establishes that SAA was operating both the airport and 
Skypark Industrial Park when it came to assessments and enforcement of the 
covenants, as a feudal fiefdom by accepting tribute in the form of solicited payment 
from some land owners, demanding them from others in return for SAA's 
agreement to waive or not enforce the restrictive land use covenants and even 
demanding payment to avoid litigation enforcing the covenants. 
Dynasty Corporation's interest is not totally aligned with the "Gas Buster" 
defendants'. At the trial, the "Gas Buster" defendants' total interest and focus was 
to challenge the restrictive land use covenants of the 1979 CC&R's in declaring 
them waived, abandoned, and unenforceable. As indicated previously, Dynasty 
does not sell fuel or operate a business that violates the restrictive land use 
36
 SAA had solicited payment for restrictive covenant waiver contracts contrary 
to the provisions of the 1979 CC&R's from the following Precision Air-
Power, Hal Young Valley Fliers, James Hoddenback, Park City Helicopters 
and Quality Aircraft Components; Exhibit A Add. I R.F. F. 29 p. 10444-
10514 ) and had threatened others with litigation unless payment was made 
(Demand letter to Roach from counsel for Dynasty Exhibit 4 to Add. I). This 
manner of doing business is contrary to the concept of CC&R's and is and 
was against SAA's best interest to preserve a level playing field regarding 
valuation and marketability among all property burdened by the restrictive 
land use covenants. 
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covenants. Dynasty's reason to challenge or seek uniform enforcement of the 1979 
restrictive land use CC&R's is much broader. 
Clearly, had Dynasty been allowed to Intervene, its interest in preserving the 
property value and marketability of its property, along with all other owners of 
property in the Skypark Industrial Park that it sought to join, would have been 
represented. Likewise, the "Gas Buster" defendants did not represent or protect 
Dynasty's interest in seeking the return of wrongful assessments that Dynasty had 
been charged, together with all other property owners in Skypark Industrial Park by 
SAA. The court's ruling that the "Gas Buster" defendants protected or represented 
Dynasty Corporation's interest is clear error requiring reversal. 
2. The Court's ruling that Dynasty's Rule 24 Motion was not 
timely filed is not supported by fact and is erroneous. 
Dynasty does not dispute that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 24, a "Motion to 
Intervene" must be timely filed. Regarding the timeliness prong of Rule 24, other 
than the court's biased statement of belief, without any finding that Dynasty 
Corporation had notice of the litigation,37 there is no evidence to dispute the 
declaration of M.K. Ebeling, Dynasty's owner, ("it is thus undisputed that Dynasty 
had no knowledge or notice of the litigation until just prior to filing the Dynasty 
action and Motion to Intervene").38 
Add. K at R. F. 31 p. 10968-10968 
Add. Q at R. F. 32 p. 11128-11130 
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The court, without making a finding or receiving evidence or testimony of 
the names and status of individuals attending any hearings conducted by the court, 
opined that during this litigation "at each hearing 15-20 members who were either 
parties to the litigation or those who occupied property at Skypark were in 
attendance/'39 The court's opinion as to the identity of individuals who may have 
attended the hearings evidently lead the Judge to a biased conclusion and belief, 
again unsupported by any evidence contradicting the declaration of M.K. Ebling, 
that Dynasty likely had notice of the litigation when the court indicated: 
"With conducting the case during the last three years and presiding 
over many hearings where 15 or 20 members, either parties to the 
litigation or those who occupied property at Skypark, their various 
different developments. The Court would find that although I do not 
make that ruling, I find it very hard to believe that there are any owners 
at Skypark that are not aware of this ongoing litigation."40 
The time from which to file a motion to Intervene cannot equitably be 
commenced to run without some evidence that Dynasty, as the Intervenor, had 
notice of the action prior to the time it actually filed it. Because the court might find 
it "hard to believe that there were owners at Skypark that are not aware of this 
ongoing litigation," the court's belief alone cannot be considered evidence of notice. 
Further, neither SAA nor "Gas Buster defendants" ever offered any explanation as 
to why neither of them complied with Utah R. Civ. P. 19(c) by providing the names 
39
 Add. K at R. F 31 p. 10935-10938 
40
 Add. K at R. F 31 p. 10935-10938 
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of all persons with an interest in the litigation and the reasons they were not joined. 
SAA was clearly aware that there were other property owners in the Skypark 
Industrial Park with an interest to determine the enforceability of the restrictive 
covenants it sought to enforce against the "Gas Buster" defendants, but for obvious 
reasons, primarily because SAA had been, for a fee, waiving the enforcement of the 
covenants against certain property owners who were doing business in the Industrial 
Park in clear violation of the restrictive land use covenants, it sought to enforce 
against defendants.41 
The issue of timeliness was briefed and argued before the lower court in 
Dynasty's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene42 and Dynasty's 
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Intervention"43 
Contrary to the single statement of SAA that "Intervention is not to be 
permitted after entry of judgment," relying on Parduhn44 With no discussion of the 
factual circumstances of the case, SAA fails to acknowledge that the ruling in 
Parduhn was made after a final judgment and appeal. More importantly, even after 
a final judgment, the court indicated that "exceptions would be made on a strong 
showing of entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling 
circumstances as will justify the failure to seek Intervention earlier." Parduhn^ 112 
P.3d at 501. The court's failure to consider the circumstances as to the reasons why 
41
 Waiver agreements of Precision Air-Power, Hal Young Valley Fliers, James 
Hoddenbach, Park City Helicopter and Quality Aircraft Components. See: Exhibit A 
to Add. I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514 
42
 Add. C at R. File 28 p. 10064-10102 
43
 Add. I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514 
44
 Add. G. at R. File 29 p. 10314-10369 
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Dynasty's motion to Intervene was not filed sooner was an abuse of discretion and 
legal error. 
Dynasty made a strong showing of entitlement and justification for filing the 
motion to Intervene when it did because SAA and the "Gas Buster" defendants both 
breached their Utah R. Civ. P. 19 obligation to notify the court of all other persons 
who may have an interest in the action. The failure to comply with Rule 19 
prevented Dynasty, and all other parties whose Joinder it sought, from receiving 
notice of the action45 and has demonstrated that the judgment rendered, even though 
Dynasty was not a party, had a negative impact on its property interest.46 
Without evidence or a finding that Dynasty received actual notice, or 
was somehow aware of the litigation, before the entry of a final appealable 
judgment, it is legal error for the lower court to base its ruling denying 
Dynasty's Motion to Intervene on the basis that it was not timely filed. 
3. The denial of Dynasty's Utah R Civ. P. 24 Motion in 
Intervention was based on an erroneous interpretation of law, 
and disregarded the necessary party analysis of Rule 19(a), 
designed to prevent inconsistent judgments* 
Following oral argument on Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, the lower court 
commenced its ruling denying the Motion by stating: 
"The Court would find, first of all, as has been indicated by Counsel, 
that in order to Intervene under Rule 24, it's necessary to show that the 
{(1)} application was timely, {(2)} that the party had an interest in the 
45
 Add. O at R.F. 32 p. 11128-11130 
46
 Add. R at R. F. 32 p. 11132-11133; Add. S at R. F. 32 p. 11135-11136 
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subject matter of the dispute, {(3)} that that interest was not 
adequately represented, and that {(4)} they may be bound by that 
judgment in the action." ("Ruling Denying Motion to Intervene and 
Join Additional Parties and Set Aside Judgment."47 
Thereafter, the court made the following findings: 
"The Court would find that, first of all, this action was filed after the 
jury verdict which was issued in June of this year. After many hearing 
and Motions in regards to this matter, and rulings by the Court, the 
Court would find that the filing of the request is untimely. 
The Court would further find that given the history of this case, and 
the evidence that has been presented by very qualified and adequate 
Counsel over the years, there are no interests of this defendant that 
were not adequately protected. 
As Counsel for the Intervener has indicated, they have a right to 
challenge whatever ruling was made in this matter, particularly issues 
relative to any refund for assessments they may have paid.48 Based 
upon that and the other aspects of the Court's ruling, the Court will 
deny the Motion to Intervene and to set aside judgment/'49 
The ruling of the lower court denying Intervention, based solely on Utah R. 
Civ. P. 24 considerations of timeliness and adequate representation, failed to address 
the core issue of whether Dynasty or the other parties whose Joinder Dynasty sought 
were necessary parties pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). The issue of failure to join 
47
 Add K, R. F 31 p. 10935-10938 
48
 Because the court denied Appellant's Motion to Intervene and join additional 
parties, as a non-party Appellant fails to understand how it has a right to challenge 
the rulings made by this court to declare the 1979 CC&R's invalid or to be awarded 
judgment against Appellee for fraudulent assessments. 
49
 Add. K,R. F. 31 p. 10935-10938 
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a necessary party may be raised "at any time in the proceedings, including for the 
first time on appeal." Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 208 P.3d 
1077,1086 (Utah App. 2009), citing Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service 
Council, 976 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999). The failure to join parties indispensable 
to a proper resolution of the controversy is grounds for dismissal of the action, 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson Michie 
Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986), citing Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 
758 (Utah 1984), and can be raised at any time. Jennings, 208 P.3d 1077,1086. 
To deny Dynasty's Motion of Joinder without a "necessary party analysis" 
regarding Dynasty Corporation and the parties whose Joinder it sought is error. 
In addressing the issue of whether or not a party is a necessary party, a court 
must engage in a two-part inquiry; the first issue the court must consider is whether 
the Intervenor or the parties sought to be joined "has a sufficient interest in the 
action to make it a necessary party." Turville, 145 P.3d 1146, citing Seftel, 767 P.2d 
at 945. In the event the court determines the party to be a necessary party and 
Joinder is feasible, the second issue in will not be discussed, as it only arises if it is 
unfeasible to join the necessary party. Turville, Id. In the "Gas Buster" action, it is 
feasible to join all of the parties that were joined in the Dynasty action v. SAA. 
The ruling in the "Gas Buster" case is void of any analysis of whether 
Dynasty or any of the parties it sought to join were necessary parties and is 
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inconsistent with the prior ruling by Judge Page that joined all the persons and 
entities Dynasty sought to join in "SAA" finding that they were necessary parties.50 
The inconsistent ruling granting Joinder as necessary parties in the action 
commenced by Dynasty against SAA, where all landowners of Skypark Industrial 
Park were joined as parties, but denying Joinder of the same parties in this, the "Gas 
Buster" action, with identical issues and parties to be joined, creates the appearance 
of inconsistent judgments that Utah R. Civ. P. 19 was specifically designed to avoid. 
The court in Dynasty v. SAA could find the 1979 restrictive land use covenants to be 
waived and/or abandoned, while the court in the Gas Buster action found them not 
be waived or abandoned. 
In Ruffinengo, the Court discussed the purpose of Utah R. Civ. P. 19. The 
lower court granted summary judgment against plaintiff who had not been named as 
a party in prior litigation and brought suit seeking to enjoin the construction of a 
residence by enforcing restrictive covenants. The defendant challenged the standing 
of plaintiff, even though plaintiff was a non-party, and further argued collateral 
estoppel. The Supreme Court held that because plaintiff was not a party to the prior 
action, plaintiff was not collaterally estopped from raising the same issues. The 
Court further held that "it has long been established that if a general scheme for 
building or development is intended by the original grantor, subsequent grantees 
may bring action against each other to enforce restrictive covenants...." The Utah 
Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment, 
2fi 
considered defendant's estoppel argument that "if plaintiff were not estopped all 
other lot owners could also sue and the burden of litigation and accompanying 
expense would be enormous." The Court found the argument to have "no real merit 
for he (defendant) needed only resort to Rule 19(a) to protect against such 
eventualities," Ruffinengo, 579 P.2d at 344. The Court explained why defendant's 
privity argument failed by indicating that "(1) It is not at all unforeseeable that 
Ruffinengo might reach a different result than did the other lot owners in the prior 
suit, simply because he may present a far different of convincing case. (2) This 
Court has a consistent policy of resolving doubts in favor of permitting parties to 
have their day in court on the merits of the controversy." Id. 344. 
Likewise, the court failed to consider or address the requirement of Section 
78B-6-403 UCA, which provides that when declaratory relief is sought "all persons 
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration...." (See p.7 herein) This argument was made and preserved in the lower 
court in Dynasty's Supplemental Memorandum of Law, where no written objection 
or motion to strike was filed.51 As a matter of judicial economy, where an issue is 
raised for the first time in a reply memorandum and where the issues could be raised 
simply by filing a separate motion, the trial court has discretion to consider the 
argument raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 
1256 (Utah App. 2005), citing Trillium USA, Inc, v. Board of County Comm'rs, 37 
P.3d 1093; Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 702 n.9 (Utah App. 
51
 Add. D at R. F. 28 p. 10064-10102 
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1994). Failure to file a motion to strike constitutes waiver of any objectionable 
material. Lister v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P.2d 933 (Utah App. 1994). 
Although the court did not appear to have considered 78B-6-403 UCA, it is properly 
considered on appeal as evidence that was before the district court. Thrasher v. B & 
B. Chemical Co., Inc., 2 F.3d 995. C.A. 10 (Okl. 1993). Every property owner in 
the Skypark Industrial Park whose property is burdened by the restrictive land use 
covenants has an interest in the determination of the validity of said covenants. 
The lower court's specific ruling denying Intervention was erroneous when it 
addressed only two of the four elements it described as being required to grant 
Intervention: (1) timeliness, and (3) Intervenor was adequately represented by 
counsel. 
4. It was error to deny Dynasty Corporation's Intervention 
relying on cases that had been ruled on prior to the 
amendment of Utah R Civ. P. 24. 
Following argument on January 26th, 2010 as the court commenced to issue its 
ruling and finding on Dynasty's Motion for Intervention, the court made a general 
statement of its understanding of the law that the Intervenor, pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 24, is required to demonstrate that it will "be bound by the judgment in the 
action" before Intervention is allowed.52 This statement is a misstatement of law 
and demonstrates the lower court's error in interpreting Utah R. Civ. P. 24. 
Although the court did not appear to base its written denial of the Motion to 
52
 See Judgment on Jury Verdict and Court Rulings, attached hereto as Addendum U 
("Add. IT) at R. F. 32 p. 11085-11088 
Intervene on this erroneous interpretation of the law, it clearly demonstrates the 
possibility and likelihood that it did. 
The court erroneously adopted the interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 24 as 
argued by SAA in its Memorandum in Opposition to Intervention, citing Parduhn 
and Lima.53 Clearly, the court did not consider Dynasty's Memorandum in Reply 
to....54 identifying that Utah R. Civ. P. 24 was amended following Parduhn and 
Lima. Cases following the amendment to Utah R. Civ. P. 24 after Lima and 
Parduhn have held that "Instead of requiring applicants to show that they will be 
"bound by a judgment in the action," the rule now requires applicants to 
demonstrate only that "the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair 
or impede (their) ability to protect that interest... Thus, the text of Utah R. Civ. P. 
24 now mandates Intervention on even more liberal terms than it did when we 
issued Lima. " Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 312. 
CONCLUSION 
Dynasty Corporation, like all property owners in the Skypark Industrial Park, 
has an interest and purpose to preserve the marketability and value of its property 
and to ensure that restrictive covenants are fairly and consistently enforced. Indeed, 
one of the stated purposes in enacting the CC&R's, as set forth in Exhibit 1 
describing the purpose of the declaration at subsection (a) provides; protects the 
owners and occupants of building sites such use of neighboring building sites as 
5 3 Add.GatR.F .29p. 10314-10369 
54
 Add. I at R. F. 29 p. 10444-10514 
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might depreciate the value of their property.. ."55 Dynasty Corporation sought to 
protect that interest after learning of the Gas Buster action commenced by SAA by 
first filing an action against SAA seeking the exact opposite relief sought by SAA in 
the Gas Buster action, and secondly, by filing a Motion to Intervene, Join additional 
parties and set aside the Judgment that had been entered. 
The court's denial of Dynasty's Motion to Intervene, Join additional parties 
and set aside the judgment because Dynasty's Motion was not timely filed and 
further because defendants adequately protected the interest of Dynasty Corporation 
was error, effectively denying Dynasty and all parties it sought to join, the rights to 
participate and protect their property interest as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 19 and 
24 and as required by 78B-6-403 UCA 1953 regarding declaratory judgments. 
For the foregoing reasons the ruling of the lower court denying Intervention 
should be reversed. 
DATED this 5th day of November 2010. 
Id D. Conder 
ey for Appellant Dynasty 
55 Add. C Exhibit 1 CC& R's at R. F. 28 p. 10064-10076, 
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